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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
JESSE SMITH and ELLA MAY
SMITH, his wife,
P"la.intif! s and A ppella;nts,
vs.
ARROWHEAD F;REI~G,HT
LINES LIMITED, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondwnt.

Case No. 6213

JOSEPH E. N E L S 0 N and
MA'RY JANE. NELS·ON, his
wife,
Plaintiffs ood Appellants,

vs.

Case No. 6212

ARROWHEAD FREIGHT
I.1INES LIMITED, a corporation

'

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
THE F'1AC'TS
Before .addressing ourselves to the contentions af appellants upon these appeals we take the liberty of presenting the fruets in some detail. We do thi~s because we
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most earnestly believe that a ·clear understanding of all
of the .facts will imp·el t~he ·court to the view that as a
matter of law plaintiff's are not ·entitled to recover. If
we should be in error in this contention then a detailed
revievv- •of the evidence will still make it perfectly clear
that plaintiffs w·ere .accorded a fair trial and tbe verdict
of the jury ~should not be dis turhed.
. These ca~ses ar.i.se from a highway collision between
a truck of defendant ·company and a F·ord single sea.te<;l
coupe, which occur~ed between Santaquin ·and Spring
Lake in Utah County •nn Nove1nber 17, 19·37. The fatal
trip, insofar as the occupants of the Ford coupe were
concerned, began at Dell's Inn, a small soft drink establishment located on Highway 91 just ~south of Santaquin.
Vaughan ISheffield, P·aul Nelson .and D~on Simmons had
resorted .to D·ell ',s Inn earlier in the evening and were
there visiting when ;Ramona Smith and Alta Ewell joined
them some time after 10 :00 o '·clock in the evening. ( Tr.
7, 16)
Sheffield was possessed of the Ford coupe and: a.t
some-one's suggestion all five of the persons named decided to ride from the inn over to P.ay.son. It is important
to note how the ~v~ persons were distributed in the small
car. Vaughan Sheffield placed himself in the driver's
seat under the .steering wheel. He was a .full groWii and
n1arried young man s:omewhat shorter and ~stockier than
D·on ,.Simmons; who testified .that he w.as just under six
feet in height. (Tr. 26)

Next to Sheffield and at his

right sat Alta Ewell, a grown young woman weighing ap-
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proximately 160. pounds. CTr. 12) · On· Alta Ewell's lap.
sat Ramona Smith, "rhose weight was estimated by the
witn€ss Ewell a.t 140 pounds. CTr. 12) On Alta'~s right
sat Don Simmons and on Simmons' lap was Paul Nelson.
The little -car was provided with a windshield in front,
a window in the door on either ~side and a. window in the
back. A0cording to plaintiffs' version, after the passengers took their places in the coupe all windows were
tightly closed to keep out the cold and the windshield
wiper was put in motion to improve the driver's vision
against the rain. (Tr. 8, 17) Thu.s loaded and thus
equipped the party left the inn in the direeti,on of Spring
Lake and Payson. The highway led them .out of Santaquin in an easterly direction toward the foothills. Acc-ording to the testimony of Simmons as they proceeded
eastward the wind dire·ction was .sueh that the rain was
much heavier against the left window and upon the left
side of the winds'hield than .against or upon other· parts
of the coupe. ( Tr. 2'5)
After the highway reached the foothills it turned to
the left and took a direction ·only slightly east of north.
In making the turn to the left the coupe ran so far onto
the outside of the ·curve that it went off the tc:ement onto
the .outside .shoulder .and almost failed to make the curve.
('Tr. 66) It righted itself and came hack onto the cement
portion of the highway and at a point four ·hundred feet
north of the curve it ran into defendant's southbound
truck. The colli.sion resulted fatally to Sheffield, Nelson
and Ramona Smith.
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An examination of the facts immediately surrounding the ·collision requires the .conclusion, we submit, that
the driver of the truck was, a~s a matter of law, free from
any negligence. At the time of the collisi·on the truck
was .on the right-hand or west side of the highway, where
it belonged, and the driver did or omitted nothing which
contributed to the ac;cident. The ·case was tried by both
sides .and submitted to the jury up'On the theory that if
the truck was on the west or the driver's righthand side
of the highway at the time of the collision there could be
no recovery by any plaintiff. How sta.nds the record
upon that p'oint~
Three persons who were in the ·Collision survived to
give their testim·ony. Alta Ewell and D'on Simmons, who
were passenger's in the coupe, and Alvin Samuelson, the
driver of the truck. But more important than the testimony of .any survivor was the evidence left upon and
near the highway by the vehicles involved.
A.s heretofore stated, Alta Ewell sat in the middle
of the single seat in the -coupe. To her left was the
driver and on her lap was Ram.ona ~Smith and to. her right
Don Simmons and Paul Nelson. Alta testified that she
''couldn't very well see out''. ( Tr. 12) She saw the
body of the truck just the instant before the collision
but s·he did not pretend t·oi sa.y where either of the vehicles wa.s upon the highway at the time of impact. The
coupe was so :crowded that she could not ·See out and her,
testimony shed no light whatsoever upon the cause of
the accident.
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Don Simmons made more of an effort to be helpful
to plaintiffs, but an examination of his testimony will
disclose that he created no suhstantial~conflict with the
evidence of the defendant. Seated hack in the corner a.s
he was with a six foot young man on his lap and two
women, one sitting upon the other, ·crowded against him
upon the left, it is extremely doubtful that he could see
through the windshield at all. He stated that he looked
over Paul Nelson's shoulder, but we contend that the law
will not permit any weight to be given to .such elaim, but
even if we assume that he could squirm .and stretch in
such manner as to permit a fleeting glimpse .of the truck
before the accident, still he tells nothing which could
fasten liability upon the defendant.
Upon dire-ct examination Simmons asserted that he
got a glimpse over Paul Nelson's .shoulder when the truck
was ten yards .away, and that the truck was then ''three
feet ·over the yellow line". ('Tr. 20) But he did not say
the truck was .over the yellow line to the ~ast. Undoubtedly the truck was over the yellow line to the west of the center of the highway ·and Simmons' statement cannot supp~ort an inference to the contrary. But more important,
Simmons testified that he did not know whether either
the Ford or the truck changed its course after he saw
the truck. ('Tr. 34) In view of the positive evidence of
the truck driver that the F.ord ·coupe suddenly changed
its course immediately before the collision and that the
point of impact occurred west of the center of the highway, leaves Simmons' testimony insufficient to raise a
question .of fact as t.o where the collision occurred.
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Samuelson sat alone in the driver's seat of the truck.
For some distance irrnnedia tely before the collision he
was driving almost directly south. About four hundred
feet south of the colli,sion the highway turns to the west.
As he moved .southward .along the high\vay Samuelson
c.ould see the lights .of an au t'o·mo bile approaching the
curve from the west. As the automobile, which proved
to be the Ford coupe involved, reached the curve it \vent
so far out ont'0 the .outer edge of the curve that it left
the ·cement .and moved onto the shouder. (Tr. 66) It was
then plain to Samuelson that the driver of the Ford was
having difficulty in guiding the machine back onto the
cement pnrtion of the highway and negotiating the curve
to the north. When the Ford finally made the turn so
that its lights were facing ,Sa,muelson it suddenly moved
aeros.s from the ea.st side .o.f the highway to the west
side. Immediately upon observing that the Ford was
no~t under full control ·Samuelson pulled his truck to the,
extreme west side of the highway so that his righthand
wheels were running on the edge .of the shoulder which
bordered the eement strip. ('Tr. 67)
1

After ,passing suddenly from the east to the west side
of the highway the F'ord seemed to right itself and moved
northwards .for a time with its whee~ls straddling the center line .of the ·cement but tending to get back onto the
east side of the highway where it belonged. But this
tendency o.f the Ford to regain its proper side of the
highway was only momentary and just before the collision the Ford sharply changed its ·Course to the west
and '~'lurched'' into the left end of the fr:ont bumper of
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the truck. (Tr. ·66) From there the Ford jammed along
the full twenty-four fnot. length of the truck and t~hen
moYed on up the highvvay and eame to rest on the east
s·houlder in a. condition ·Of almost -complete demolition.
(Tr. 67) Sa.muelHon 's testimony is that at the instant of
collision his truck 'vas as far .over upon the righthand
(west) shoulder of the highway as it could be safely
driven .and that the Ford came into the west side where
it had no lawful right to be. ('Tr. 66, 67) The tHstimony
of .S.amuels·on in this respect is .confirmed by unimpeachable evidence of the marks left upon and near the highway.
'!'he collision under discussion received extraordinary attention from public officers whose duty it wa.s to
investigate such occurrences and wh'o went upon the
scene in their official ·Capacities for the purpose of careful and impartial inspection. Within a. few minutes after
the accident Len Huff and Ralph Chapple, tr,affic officers
of Payson City, were at the scene making observations
and discovering and noting marks upon the highway. ('Tr.
288, 318) Within approximately an hour of the accident a deputy .sheriff .of Uta:h County and a member of
the State Highway Patrol .arrived upon the scene and
spent approximately one hour and a half i:n making min-.
ute inspecti'ons and investigations of -conditions. (Tr.
178, 213)

Early on the morning followi·ng, the sheriff

of Utah County and one of his deputies arrived upon the
scene in .company with assistant county attorney, Dean
Terry. ('Tr. 192, 333) ·These men were foll owed shortly
1
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by Ralph Smith, chief inspector for the Public Service
Commission of Utah, and one of his assistants. (Tr. 283)
All of the officers mentioned went to the scene of
the accident in the line 'Of their duty and each was charged
with the responsibility of making a careful inspection
and observation for the purpose of determining, if possible, the cause of the collision. The testimony nf all
investigator·s tells with full accord that the accident oceurred on the west ·side of the highway where the truck
had a lawful right to be and where the Ford had no
right to be.
B·efinre deseribing fue significant marks upon the
highway .and adjacent earth, it seems well to briefly deseribe the highway itself. At the point of the accident
the roadway was approximately level .and .for four hundred feet south and several hundred feet north of the
point of impact the road was .straight and ran in a directi~on about north and south. There is a cement strip
eighteen feet and two inches wide with a yellow line about
three inches wide marking the middle of the strip. On
either side of t:he ·cement there is .a gravel and sand
shoulder about four. and one-half feet wide and approximately level with the cement strip for .a distance of four
a·nd 'One-half feet on either. side and .sloping from the
outer edge at a rate of about one .and one-half to one.
The shoulders were firm and provided good support for
traffic. On the east ·side :of the 'highway a level was obtained at the time of ·construction by cutting away the
hillside, while on the west side the same level was ac-
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complishe-d by means of filling. To the west of the highway the ·C-ountryside slopes to the west. and beyond the
shoulder \Yas covered with soft s-oil. East of the high\Yay the countryside rises to the nearby hills.
The truck involYed \Vas a GMC 1'937 model weighing
about ten tons ''~th its load. Across the front of the
truck \Vas a heavy steel bumper about eight inches wide
and one-half inch thick. (Tr. 184) The front wheels were
the customary ·single \vheels equipped with pneumatic
tires. Behind the front wheels there were two sets of
dual wheels on either side, the first set .of dual wheels
being referred to .as the drivers and t~he rear set as the
dollies. The "~heels on either side were so aligned that
the dual wheels .on the rear straddled the line of the front
wheels "\\7hen the truck was in forward motion.
An examination of the truck following the accident
sho\ved that the initial impact of the Ford upon the truck
was up'on the extreme left .end of the bumper. The
bumper was bent back and driven against the left front
wheel, turning the wheel in and :driving it back against
the frame. (Tr. 184)· From there the Ford moved on
against the front left fender, forcing it back against the
cab door. (Tr. 20) The Ford then .moved on against and
under t'he left side of the body to the rear \vheels. Bamuels-on eould feel first the front end and then the entire side
of the truck lift from the highway as the F:ord erashed
along and against the front corner anl left side ,of the
truck. (Tr. 67)

The ·collision destroyed the steering con-

trol of the truck and it turned to the right and left the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
highway. It came to rest west of the highway in the
soft s'oil .at an angle of about forty-five degrees to the
highway, while t~he Ford, reduced to junk .as it wa·s, continued its course and traveled northward up the highw:ay unti1 it finally eame to rest on or ne,ar the shoulder
on the east side.
T'he marks on and near the cement highway leave it
perfectly plain where t'he truck and Ford were with relati,on to the ·Center ·of the highw.ay at the instant of impact. At rest after the collision, the right rear wheels
of the truck vvere the nearest part ·of the truck to the
cement strip. The distance be'tween those wheels and
the \vest edge of the cement was sixteen feet. (Tr. 196)
Trhe truck, being twe·nty-four feet long, the front wheels
were approximately forty feet west of the west edge of
the cement. The left front wheel o.f the truck, having
been cramped in and driven ha:ck by the collision, dug
or ,gouged out a conspicuous groove or furrow in the west
shoulder and int:o the soft earth beyond. The furrow referred to could be m:ost plainly traced from the left .front
wheel back to the left rear whee1s, under those wheels
and hack to and upon the shoulder. ( Tr. 185, 186) That
furrow or depression, o.f course, ended at the west edge
of the cement but exactly at the edge .of the cement where
the depreS'sion ended there appeared upon the cement
a most conspicuous rubber burn or tire mark extending
in a ·curve northward up the west half of the .cement in a
solid black line for eighteen feet and .six inches. Following the black rubber burn from the e.ast end of the
furrow referred to onto the pavement it curved to the
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north from a northeast ...south,vest direction to a direction
almost north and south. That mark, moving into the
pavement from the \Yest edge, never reached or erossed
the center line of the highway, but continued its full
length upon the west side. The north end of the burn
was the nearest point in its entire length to the middle
of the 'highway and that point wa,s five feet and eight
inches west of the center uf the highway and only three
feet six inche.s east ·Of the west edge of the cement. ('Tr.
77' 80, 186, 187' 192, 198, 199, 2:30, 221, 222' 223 ' 250' '251'
270,278,284,286,309,313,314,322,336, 337)
That the rubber burn on the cement thus de-scribed
wa.s made by the left front wheel of t he truck was demonstrated beyond all reasonable dispute. Ordinarily
one seeing a rubber tire burn on the pavement might he
left to some speculation .as to what tire produced it. But
that heavy black mark, five to seven inches in width, could
be followed from its northern end on the west side of
the highway southerly and we~sterly over to the west edge
of the pavement where it continued, not as a. burn but
as a deep gro:ove across the shoulder, down the slope of
the .shoulder, across .sixteen feet of soft soil to the left
rear wheels, under the rear wheels and approximately
twenty-four feet further west to the cripp[ed left front
wheel where it ended.
1

Eight feet north of the north end of .the rubber mark
which we have just des-cribed there began another rubber burn which ran in a northerly direction and whic.h led
unerringly to th·e tire on the left rear wheel of the Ford.
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That mark bega.n at a point three fe~t six inches west of
the ·Center of the highway and continued in solid form
for about ten feet. From there on it was a broken line
to the left rear of the Ford. (Tr. 78, 188, 189, 190, 199,
200, 202, 228, 231, 234, 33-6, 337, 338) That mark or
burn continued, as one followed it northward on the west
side of the center line of the ~highway for a distance of
approximately twenty-five feet CTr. 338) when it curved
a.cros.s the -center line and ·crossed the east half of the
cement to the Ford coupe. The total length of that series
of rubber burns which led south and west from the Ford
to .a point three .feet six inehes west of the -center line,
was forty . . seven feet. In addition to the recurring rubber burns which made up the mark just described there
were, along with rubber burns, frequent .scratches in the
pavement made by contact with metal parts of the F'ord ·
as it bounced along. ('Tr. 189) Als·o, there were smears
of paint from time to time which were the ,s-ame color a.s
t~he paint covering the Ford. (Tr. 210, 343) Just as the
first tire mark de.s-crihed w.as inescapably made by the
left front wheel of the truck, so w;as the second line of
tire and paint marks made by the Ford.

It is equally

heyond any rea.sonable dispute that both marks began in
about the middle of the we,st half of the p.ave1nent. While
the north end ·of the tire burn made by the left front
wheel of the truck was eight feet south of the south end
of the burn made by the Ford, both burns began in the
west half of the pavement and one is impelled to the conclusion that the two vehiciles came together on the west
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half of the cement at a point at or near where one or the
other of these marks c.ommenced.

All of the .marks just des.cribed were observed on the
evening of the accident and carefully noted by city traffic
officer Huff of P'ayson ·City, by Dep.uty Sheriff Christensen of Utah County, by State Highway Patrolman Allred
and by the truck driver Samuelson and the witness Wiegand, an employee of the defendant. They were carefully
noted and observed the fol~orwing morning and careful
measurements were ma.de by Deputy Sheriff Christensen
and Assistant County Attorney Terry aided by Sheriff
Durnell.
Furthermore, the mark made hy the left front wheel
of the truck was observe-d and noted on the night .of the
accident by Traffic Officer Chapple ·of Payson and on
the following morning by Chief Inspector Smith of th·e
Public Service Commission.
In addition to the .marks left on the eement and
other marks heretofore des-cribed there were some most
significant marks along the west .shoulder of the highway. Along the shoulder immediateQy behind the truck
most marks that might have been made there were
trampled out by curious persons who gathered soon after
the accident. ('Tr. 251, 253, 271) But beginning on the
west shoulder a few feet north of the truck t;he tracks
made by the righthand du·al wheels ·Of the truck could be
plainly seen along the edge of the shoulder for a distanee
of approximately fifty feet. This fact was noted and
testified to without dispute by City Officers .c:happle and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
Huff of Payson, State Patrolman .Al!lred, kssistant County Attorney Terry and by '8amuelsnn and Wiegand. (Tr.
2'26, 227' 2.35, 272, 278, 78, 84, 303, 325, 329)
Plaintiffs offered as witnesses certain persons who
were very briefly at the scene and who were drawn t1here
by -curiosity. None of the,m was there f.or the purpose
of making any investigation .and none made any measurements or any record of what he saw. None remained at
the .scene longer than a few minutes. ~Some of them failed
to see the marks noted and measured .by the investigating
'officers but none denie·d that such marks were there.
Some testified to the presence of other marks upon the
highway but such marks could not possibly have
been made hy eithe-r of the vehicles involved in the
collision under reVIi-ew. It was contend·ed upon the
trial that the position of the truck after the collision justified the contention th~at certain marks
testirfied tn by Lant, Winn and McMillan were
made by the truck a:fter the impact and before it
left the -cement strip. But no such inference .can be
justified as it is in .conflict with und.isputed and controlling physical facts. If the truck had been in the position
that such an inference would require it would inevitably
have extended entirely .across the highway with the front
end at the west shoulder and t he rear end on or over the
east .shoulder. In such a situation the Ford would have
been required to go 'to the extreme west side of the highway in order to .s~trike the front of the truck and it would
have 'been utterly impossi'ble for it to rub along the side
of the truck and continue no-rthward up the highway a
1
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distance of more than forty-seven feet as it actually did.
If the inference contended for by appellants were adopted
then all the undisputed physical facts app.e.aring after the
collision would need to be revised .and amended. In suc.h
a case the Ford wo-uld have run flush into the ~side of
the truck. It would either have stopped at that point or
it would have gone under or over the truck. No one contends that any such thing occurred.
A despairing effort was made by appellants to extricate themselves ·by res·ort to expert testimony. An
engineer was sworn and testified that he had been put
into possession of a truck somewhat similar to the 'one
here involved; that he had driven the truck down some
highway-not the one here involved-and had been unable to guide it o-ff the highway at the angle at which appellants ~contend defendant's truck lefi the highway. Of
course, he did not .select a highway to drive off where
there was .a precipitous shoulder and he did not arrange
to have a heavily laden Ford -collide .at high speed with
his left front wheel as he began the turn. He frankly
admitted upon eross exa.mination that experiments sue~h
as he undertook are ·of no value unless all factors which
might influence the result are dupli~cated. His closing
answers upon cross examination are an admission that
his experiment was of no value. ('Tr. 174)
In view of the foregoing facts defendant requested
the court for a directed verdict and it is submitted that
such motion should have been granted. If it should have
been gran1ed then, as we contend, none of the plaintiffs

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
was entitled to a verdict from the jury. The motion, having been overruled, the case went to the jury upon instructions which fully and fairly presented plaintiffs'
theory of the -case .and there is no error in the record of
whi.ch the plaintiffs can fairly complain.

ARJGUMEN'T UPON APPEL:LtANTS'
.AJS.SIGN·MENT S
Plaintiffs assign erro.r on the part of the trial court
in four parti~culars. T!heir first assignment of error is
that the court refused to give their requested instruction
No. 4 in the langu,age requested. An examination of the
entire charge to the jury will demonstrate that the jury
were fully and fairly -charged upon the theory contained
in plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 4. The instruction as requested reads as :follows :
''You are instructed, members of the Jury, that
the Defendant has alleged that Ramona Smith
was guilty of CJontributory negligence. The
·burd·en i·s ·on the Defendant to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Ramona
S·mith was guil{ty of contributory negligence.
·That is, negligence which directly contributed
to her death. , In .this connection you are instructed that if the fact th1a t five pers.ons '\vere
riding in t~he F:ord coupe at the tin1e of the
collision did not directly ·cause or directly contribute to the ·collision in which Ramona Smith
was killed, then, and in that case, the mere
fact that Ra~mona Smith was r·iding in a. F·ord
·COUpe with four other ·persons would not defeat any right that Plaintiffs Jes·se ·Smith and
Ella May 'Smith may have to recover.in this
action.''
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Our contention \Y'as, and now is, that upon· all the
facts the occupants of the Ford coupe were guil'ty of contributory neglig'ence as a matter of law, but the court
having rejected our contention in that matter fully
charged the jury in ac.corda.nce with plaintiffs' theory.
In plaintiffs' brief only a portion of the court's instruction No. 7 as given is set forth, but having in mind
the language ·Of the request we have just quoted it becomes essential to refer to certain parts of the charges
actually given.

Tthe court '.s instruction No. 7, to whieh

no exception was taken, reads as follows :
''You are further .instru-cted that it is provided
by the laws of the State of Utah, that it shall
be unlawful for the driver -of any vehicle to
drive the same when such vehicle is so loaded,
or when there are in the front seat of such
vehicle such number of persons, as to obstruct
the view of the driver to the front or sides,
or to interfere with the driver's control over
the mechanism of the vehicle. It is further
provided by law that it shall be unlawful f.or
any passenger in any auto-mobile to ride in
such position as to interfere with the driver's
view ahead or to the ·sides, or to interfere
with the driver's control.over the driving me·Chanism of the automobile.
''And in this ·connection, you .are instructed that
it is for the jury to find and determine from
all the facts and circumstances shown to exist
at .the time of the collision herein, "rhether·
either of the occupants, to-wit: Paul L. Nelson or Ramona. Smith, was guilty of negligence in beeoming a passenger in said Ford
·Coupe along with ~he driver and ot'her oecu-
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pants therein, and whether ·Or not such negligence contributed in any degree to the collision and to the injuries suffered, as complained of.''
Instruction No. 7 quoted above is ha'Sed upon 57-7-50
R. S-. U. 19'33 which, like all similar statutes governing
the operation of motor vehicles, is intended to prom.ote
the .safety of the highways. The section became a part
of the statute law of this state after the accident involved
in Ba.lle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 Pac. (2d) 224, had
taken plaee.
From the foregoing the -court will observe that it was
plainly left to the .jury to determine not only whether
Paul Nelson or Ramona Smith was guilty of negligence
in becoming a passenger in the Ford coupe, but also
whether ·such negligence contributed in any degree to the
collision and to the injuries suffered. In connection with
this subject it is also important to observe the language
of the court'.s instruCJti:on No. 9.
''If you find from a preponderance of the evidence
that either the said PaulL. Nelson or Ran1ona
ISmit~h, w~as killed by reason of. the negligence
·of the defendant, as alleged in the Complaints
herein, then, in order to defeat the plaintiffs'
right of recovery on t~he ground of contributory negligence, the burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sraid PaulL. Nelson or the said
Ramona Smith, was guilty of negligence that
pro~mately contributed to his or to her own
death. And if upon the issue of contributory
negligence, the preponderance of the evidence
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is in favor of the plaintiffs, in either case, or
if it is equaHy ba1aneed, you should find such
issue in f~avor of the plaintiff.''
It w·ill be ohserved that the jury was there instructed
that if eith~r Ramona Smith or Paul Ne~son was killed
as a re-sult o£ the negligence of the defendant recovery
for such death or deaths could only he defeated if the
jury further found, first, that they, or either of them, was
guilty of negligence, and second, that such negligence
proximately contributed to the injury and death.
Again in the court's ins,truction No. 11 it is made
clear that the jury eould not defeat recovery on the
grounds of contributory negligence unless such negligen1ce were found to be a proximate -cause of the injuries.
In the court '.s instruction No. 20 proxima;te cause is
clearly defined by the .court. It is well settled that if,
upon the hearing, a party's theory is fully and fairly
sent to the jury such a party cannot complain because
the ·exact language prop-osed in .a request for instruction
was not followed.

The full import of plaintiffs' request

was given in such a. way that the ju.ry could not have
been misled.

Grow v. U. L. ct T. ·Co.,
37 Utah 41, 106 Pac. 514;
Cromeenes v. San Pedro~ Los Angeles &
Salt Lake Railroad Co., 37 Utah 475,
109 Pac. 10;
Credit Men v. Boyle Furniture,
43 Utah 573, 136 P.ac. 572;
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Jensen v. D. & R. G. Railroad,
(1'9'14) 44 Utah 100, 138 Pae. 1185;
Barlow v. 8. L. & U. Ry,
57 Utah 312, 194 Pac. 665.
Plaintiffs se'cond assignment of error is based upon
the eourt 's refusal to give plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 3 to the effect that P:aul Nelson and Ramona
Smith were required to exercise only that degree of care
and caution which persons of like age, capacity and experience must re-asonably be expected to naturally and
ordinarily use in the same siltuation ·and under like cir·Cumstances.· In connection with this request it must be
remembered that Paul Nelson was a grown young man
twenty years of age and that for a num·ber of years he
had 1been employed in different occupations and a.t the
time ,of his dealth was engaged as a prosp·ector. H·e was
a young man of ordinary intelligence and was looked to
by the plaintiffs for contribution~ toward their maintenance and support.
Ramona Smith had become sixteen years of age in
June preceding the· accident. She had completed part
of a high school education and because of her mother's
illness was discharging the duties of a grown woman
a'bout the house. Both Paul Nels·on and Ramona Smith
were of stature .and weight ·above the average for grown
women and men.
In neither case were plaintiffs entitled io the requested instruction. While we are not unaware of general holdings hy this co.urt that the ·care required of an
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inf·ant is to- be graduated to his age, nevertheless, up·on
the record here made ~here is no authority requiring the
giving of the request involved in eit~her ca.se.
It has been genera·lly recognized that children of
tender years are so far undeveloped as to be relieved of
the charge of· negligence; that during another period in
their infancy thel"e is rebuttable presumption against
their capacity to understand and avoid danger; and that
in the later years of infancy there is rebuttable presumption that they are chargeable with the san1e degree of
care as are adults. Ordinarily a child under seven year.s
of age is conclusively presumed not guilty of contributory
negligence. Between the ages of seven and fourteen,
in the absence of showing to the contrary, an infant is
genera.Hy assumed not to have the sa.me consciousness
of danger and the same judgment in avoiding it as an
adult. Above the age of fourteen, in the absence of a
showing to the contrary, an infant is generally charged
with 1laving attained that development which imposes
upon him the same d·egree of care as an adult. This rule
is well .stated in J one's Commen!taries on Evidence,
volume 1, section 99 (a), pages 477 et seq.
,,, In cases of torts arising from negligence, too,
the age and capacity of the infant charged
,,. .ith the tortious negligence may become matters ·of importance. For while infants ar~e
justly a.nswera'ble for torts springing from
their negligence, when such negligence is
shown, it is evident that, in determining t~he
question "rhether or not there is negligence
in the given case, either on the part of the de-
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fendant ·Or on that of the plaintiff, the age and
capacity of the defendant may be important
to consider. Conduct which would be considered negligent on the part of a person of
full age might not be so ·00nsidered in the
case of an infant of tender years and immature judgm·ent. And, on the other hand,
one dealing w~th a person of immature capacity 1nay be reas-onably required to exercise
grela.te~ eare and diligence 'than wou1 d ibe
demanded of him where he has to do with
persons of mature judgment .and of ordinary
·capacity. That which will be negligenc-e on
the part of one infant may be proper care on
the part oof another, depending upon the age,
discretion, intelligence, or experience, of the
infant. A child of tender years has capacity
to exercise only such care and self-restraint
as belongs to childhood. Reasonable men are
presumed to know this, and must govern
them·selves ac:eordingly. ·The caution and care
required ·Of others to\vard the infant are
measured by the age, the maturity, the capacity, and intelligence of .th·e child. So that,
"rhi1e in civil actions the law does not fix any
arbitrary age when an infant is deemed incapable of exercising judgment and discretion, there are num·erous instances in "rhir h
courts have conclusively presumed children
of tender years incapable of contribu.tory negligence and have refused to submit the question to the jury. The cases show that this
presumption has been indulged in by t~he court
respecting children varying in age fro1n one
to seven years. A ·child, too young to exereise any eare or discretion, is 'clearly as incapable of negligenc·e as it is of crime or sin,
and is therefore not ans\verable to the doctrine of self-defens.e. 'There are ages so
young (usually under s-even) that therP is a
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conclusive presumption of la,v, and hence evidence is no\t admissible to refute the presumut1on ~ while there are other ages, usually S·even,
after reaching "\Yhich it bec:ome.s a prima facie
presumption only, and may then be rebutted
by evidence of unusual natural capacity,
physical condition, training, habits of. life,
experience, surroundings, and the like. This
prima facie presun1ption .continues in its favor
till it reaches another age, usually fourteen,
after which the presumption .changes, and thEburden is then on the infant to sh<>w want of
capacity or understanding. The questio·n as
to "\vhethe:r a child's .capac1ty is. such that it
may be chargeable with contributory negligence is a question of fact for the jury, unle.s~
so young .and immature as to require the eourt
to judicially kno-vv that it could not contribute
to ilts own injury or be responsible for it'S acts,
·Or so old and rila ture that the court must kn<:rw·
that, though an infant, yet it is responsible.
Where the infant is under fourteen years of
age, the burden rests upon the defendant -to
re'but the legal presumption of incapability of
contributory negligence. As to t1hose over
fourteen years of age the prima facie capability of negligence atta-chHs. Each ease
must d·ep·end upon the intelligence and capacity of t~he child ·and the surTounding facts
rather than upon any arbitrary rule. It cannot be said on the ·one hand that a child just
past seven years is sui juris so as to he
~charged with negligence, nor, on the otheif
!hand, that a child just under that age is \Yholly incapable of exercising care. It ha~s generally been held that, since there is no ex·act
period fixed by the law ·at which there is no
doubt as to whether the ·child is sui juris, the
question of intelligence and ability to exercise care is for the jury under proper in•

L
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structions from the court. But it has been
held that, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a: child fourteen years of age is presumed to have sufficient cap:acity to be
sensible of danger and to have the power to
avoid it."
The point raised by this dicussion ';vas directly
passed upon in :
Mamiove v. Lavelle, ('Texas) 235 S. W.
Black v. Grossma;n, (Pa.) 142 Atl.

•

._ _·

!

·

324~

316~l~V~

11..~ Crouch v. Noland,(Ky.) 38 S. W. (2d) 471; ~-.

~~~I,;

Co.,~·~~~t.

Heflin v. Eastern Railway
-~ ~V.~~ _. (Texas) 159 S. W. 499;

~a~ a.
~ "W.YI•:
~.,
~~~~K'RailroadCompanyv.Rodgers,35S.W.243; qJ~
....1

~Charlton v. 4~nd §treet Railroad,
~ .~
~~ .J A ~
~ 80 N.Y. S. 1t4;
• ~-r;_.
4
11
~~~~ · McDonatd v. Metropolita;n Railrb(!:d Co.~~

i·

•

~~~·~-:;-&LA~J!·,r s. ~577; J:t'1.',-' ~ r- ~"" f~A.f)~

..

,_ _ ...- .· . ·'
~nftl·
~ _!- ,.....~

~~~.
If'"
-~

vJ" .,.

.

J';ra:cu.s~

<

·o~.·-·,_
·,_.~-~£!-

Koehler v.
Spemalty Mfg. C. . .
.42 N. Y. S. 182,
~~ .
Htlltard v. Murdock,
~ _ ·
(Texas) 20 S. W. (2d) 1070; ·"<' . ~¥
San Antonio Traction Co. v. Ku11tpf, ~
(Texas) 99 S. W. 86·3.

Inso£ar .as the N elso1i case is concerned the question
has been definitely settled against appellants' contention.
It will,be remembered that Paul Nelson was twenty years
of age at the time of the collision. There was no showing
upon the trial of any d·efi'ciency, either physical or mental,
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connected ''"ith his developn1ent. N·ot only would the
generalla '':- charge N-elson, in the absence of some proper
showing, with the responsiibility ·Of an adult but this court
has gone one step further ,and has held that one nineteen
years .of a.ge is to be reg~arded .as an adult in d·etermining
the presence or absence of contributory negligence. In
Netvton v. Oregon Short Lilne, 43 Utah 219, 230; 134 P.
567, this court dealt with a. collision betw·~en a train and
a minor nineteen years and eleven months of age. Young
Newton was killed ·O~ a street crossing and the question
of his contributory negligence ca.me under review by this
eourt. In speaking to the precise p·oint now presented
this. court said :
''In principle this cas-e is not distinguishable from
the case .of Cro1neenes v. San Pedro, Los
Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company, 37
Utah 475, 109 Pac. 10, Ann. Cas. 1912C,
307. The only essential difference between
that case and the one at bar is th.at in that
case the injured boy was ·only about twelve ·
years :old, and hence was clearly of immature
age, while in this case the deceased must be
treated as a young man (an adult), .and
further that in the Crome-enes Case the trains
were approaching •O·n the two tracks from opposite directions.''
Ramona Smith was ~sixteen and .a half years of age
at the time of the fatal collision and, in the abs.ence of
some .showing to the contrary, plaintiffs were not entitled
to have her conduct measured by that ,of any subnormal
pers-on. The general rule of law f.or which we ·Contend,
that one the .age of Ramona S·mith is not entitled under
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the circumstances in this case to he regarded as under
any disability in the absence of :a showing to that effect,
is clearly reflected in the announced public policy of the
state in connection with the operation .of motor vehicles
upon the highways. A woman sixteen years of .age and
otherwise qualified is ·entitled to receive from the state
a license to drive an automobile upon all :of the highways
of the state. This .authorization must proceed upon the
assumption that in the :absence ,of some demonstrated
infirmity, not presumed to exist in persons sixteen years
of age, such .a person is presumed to .possess that discretion and phy.sical eapacity consistent with the safe
use of the highways.
We do not ·eontend that the statute, withholding
licenses to drive fr.om persons under sixteen years of
age and authorizing their issuance to persons sixteen
years of age and over, undertakes to declare that all
persons licensed to ·drive possess the same ·capacity, but
it -certainly must be -construed as setting an age at and
.above which the presumpti,on of adult r·esponsibility attaches. If either Paul Nelson or Ramona Smith had
failed to attain the mental and pby,sical development
normally attained at their respective ages the facts could
easily have been presented by appellants and the burden
was upon them to make the proof. In both cases the
proof was exactly to the contrary. The picture the
jury got was of a perfectly normal young man twenty
years of age and a perfectly normal young "roman
sixteen years of age. N·either was subnormal in any
respect and upon the record the jury should not have
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been instructed that it was at liberty to !apply to their
conduct any standards applicable to subnormal persons.
The cases cited by app·ellants in their brief do not
hold against our ·contention in this respect. Appellants
cite

Balle v. Srnith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P. (2d) 224;
1vlontague v. Salt Lake & Utah Ry.,
53 Utah 368, 174 P. 871;
Kyne v~. Southern Pacific Co.,
41 Utah 368, 126 P. 311.
We will discuss them in the order cited.
The minor involved in Balle v. Smith was fourteen
years of age and it is true that this court stated that the
degree of care required of her was not the same as that
required tOf an adult, but the question here presented was
not before the ·Court as clearly appears from the opinion.
It is stated in the opinion that: ''No reference is made
in any .of the requested instructions to the plaintiff '·s
.age and the degree of care required of :a. minor fourteen
years of age. ''
Fr,om the foregoing it would .appear that it was not
necessary for a ·decision of the Balle ·case to rule upon
the precise point here presented. Certainly it w.as not
necessary for the court to rule upon the standard of
care required, in the absence of :a. showing of some d.eficiency, of a sixteen ~or twenty y.ear old per.son. In connection with the :obiter dictum in Balle v. Smith may he
observed that in Payne v. Utah-Idaho .Sugar. Company,
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62 Utah 598, 607; 221 P. 56.8, this court in discussing
whether plaintiff's injury was brought within the attractive nuisance theory ~stated: ''It may indeed be
seriously questioned whether ~a lad of plaintiff's age
and mentality may avail himself of the doctrine here
involved." Plaintiff in that ·Case was fourteen years
and eight months 'o·ld and ·sought recovery from the
sugar company on the ground that it maintained a
nuisance attractive to- children.
In the Montague case, supra, the young woman was
seventeen years old at the time of trial-probably sixteen at the time of the :accident-but in that ·Case there
was no question before the court such as the one· presently under review. There was no question there and
no holding with regard to instructions upon the degree
of ·care required in any· given case of a sixteen year old
minor. There the question was whether the trial court
should have instructed the jury to find ·contributory
negligence as a matter of law. This court sustained the
trial ·Court in s·ending the case to the jury in view of
''her age, her lack of experience, the duty imposed upon
her by law, and all of the other facts and circumstances''
(Utah report, volume 52, page 371). Plainly in that
case there must hav·e been a showing .of a ''lack of
experience'' and other ''facts :and ·circumstances'' which,
when viewed in connection with the plaintiff's youth,
moved this ·Court to the conclusion that contributory
negligence as a matter of law had not been established,
and that is all the case decides. In this case there is no
showing of lack of experience and no showing of any
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facts and circumstances which might be considered 1n
c-onnection with the youth of the pers,ons involved.

Kyne v. 8. P. Co. involved a child ten years of age
and we would readily !agree that in the absence of a
clear showing of extraordinary development care required of her \Yas not the care which would be required
of an .adult.
By its decision in the Newton case this court has
settled the rule against plaintiffs in the N·elson case and
it is earnestly submitted that upon the facts of the particular case and the general law applicable thereto plaintiff~s

in the Smith case "rere not entitled to the instruction
requested.
Our c.ontention in this respect is sustained by well
considered cases from other jurisdictions. A distinction

is recognized between a situation wherein a minor passively fails to sense ·danger ~and one wherein the minor
actively creates. the dange'r himself. It has been held
that a minor who participates in the overcrowding of an
automobile is guilty of -contributory negligence as .a matter of law.
In Mahoney v. City of Pittsburgh, 181 Atl. 590, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had for r·eview a -case
in which eight persons crowded into a Ford coup·e, four
in the front seat and four in the rumble.

An accident

resulted and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1n
holding that the ·Crowding of the Ford contributed as
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a matter of law to the injuries, made the following statement:
''It is common knowledge that the space on the
front seat ·of such a car is .slightly more than
three and less than four feet, and that about
one-half :of it is designed to accommodate the
driver and furnish him with sufficient room
t.o manipulate the apparatus designed to control the course of the car. Leonard, one of
the witness-es, who sat ·On the front seat, said
he weighed 180 p·ounds and that one of the
wome.n .sat on his knee with her back
Another woman sat beto the doo~r.
tween Leonard and the driver. A driver
n1ust al\vays have his car under reas-onable control, though the measure of
that duty may vary with circumstances;
what is reas-onable on a highway in the country may he unreasonable in built-up sections.
(Lorah v. Rinehart, 243 Pa. 231, 89 A. 967;
McGettigan v. Quaker City A. Co., 48 Pa.
Super. 602); the driver is affected by pro. .
visions of the Motor Vehicle ·Code providing
rules for safe driving (Jamison v. Kamerer,
313 Pa. 1, 169 A. 231; Farmer v. Nevin Bus
Lines, 107 Pa. Super. 153, 163 A. 41; Stevenson v. Sarfert, 310 Pa. 458, 165 A. 225;
Hegarty v. Borger, 304 Pa. 221, 155 A. 484);
by the condition of the highway (Mason v.
C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 302 Pa. 472, 153 A.
754) ; and by the .character of the load carried
or the manner ,of loading (D.orris v. Bridgman & Co., 29·6 Pa. 198, 145 A. 827; Boyle
v. Leech, 298 Pa. 188, 148 A. 70). In this case
the crowding of the front s·eat would so impede and restrict the driver's freedon1 of
motion as to make it impossible for hin1 to
act freely in such emergencies as must have
been expected .and actually occurred. This
c~o·wding not only deprived him of the room
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required to manipulate the .steering wheel
and control the course of the ear generally,
but put him at serious disadvantage in operating the gearshift and the brake. This impairment of the power of .control, considered
\vith the condition of the street, the poor visibility, and the corresponding necessity for
a high degree of care, make it evident that the
driver's negligence was .a -contributing cause
to the accident.
''Plaintiff, though ·a g~est, assisted in bringing
about the crowded condition of the car. He
\Vas cognizant ,of the danger (he was an experienced driver) and was therefore likewise
guilty of contributory negligence. Curry v.
Riggles, 302 Pa. 156, 159, 153 A. 325, and
cases here cited.''
To the same effect i!s Mcintyre v. Pope, 191 Atl. 607,
wherein the Supreme Court ,nf Pennsylvania .again ruled
that:
"Where more than three adult persons sit in the
the front ·seat of an automobile, thus overcrowding it and restricting the driver's freedom of action to exercise necess!ary control
in the event of emergencies, and injuries
result, those overcrowding the front seat are
guilty of contributory negligence a:s a matter
of law."
In the case just quoted from it is interesting to observe that the plaintiff was eighteen years of age and
was not the driver of the Ford coupe but simply a
passenger who contributed to the overcrowding. In
that case plaintiff urged that she should have been relieved of the charge of negligence because of her youth.
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That contention was disposed of by the court In the
following language:
"It is conill1·on knowledge, based on everyday ex,
Jr::- 1
... ~J>erience, that the ~overcrowding of the drivIM-~-~ Pr,.f~~r's seat interferes seriously with reasonable
.,,... ·
~ control ·of the car, especially in the event of
:,...,~-~ ·
emergencies which are likely to present them~ .. ,
,1~
selves; and, where an accident results from
· t ~~-.-- ~. the manner in "\vhich the car is operated, the
inevitably follows that in son1e
1\ 1\;rw /; 1,.,
measure the in1pairrnent of his control 0onf V j J.: JJ ~·t.
tributed to it .and was one of the efficient
~':~·-,
_
causes of the injuries resulting. The hamp~/· tJif,.
~· ering of appellee's control co-existed and
0 -,
·Operated with his own recklessness in driv.. J... ~ ~ ing at an excessive :speed in causing the col~~ ... j
lision, and cannot be viewed in any other
llAi •
light than as a oontributing cause.
"It is also argued that, under the circumstances,
,.,_. considering appellee's age, knoWledge, and ex· ~.~
,. ..- ~ ~
perience, she could not have he en expected to
: • '.-.t J.~g. .··-·
know of the hazard created by her presence
, ~V"""
in the driver's seat, and to charge her with
~ ~· _iJ
contributory negligence .she must have had
Ab~
'.
reason to realize the existence of the danger
f ~~•.· )t, Jj......
and failed to do that which an ordinarily
~·r;:~J;j;)
prudent person would do under the circu~~ ·· . iN"i_
:=-~..J)l~stances. AppelLant was bound to exercrse
~,.Mr.:.~ reasonable care under the circumstances.
~ .~
·J·~ I:ack .of kno,vledge of the da~gerous condi"V"" t, \ I.A." bon created by the overcrowdmg of the seat
t ·. ~ would not absolve her from meeting this
~
t-standard of care in spite of her status as a
~7
guest. Under the facts here presented, she
was one of the active participants in the
'.A _i.J, .
hazard impairing appellee's control. This
tY"' .,.., ~. '!Uust be distinguished from a case where the
negligence attributed to the guest 0onsists of
''V
, r'' f
sitting by and joining by acquiescence in the

t/.J /" ~~,conclusion
f

j

....

6.).t .

i

..

l

f'f
1.

_
A"
B'"

i.

1•

7
·

•1

~. ~~'~

~J\

~ b~·
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negligence of the driver \Yithout adequate
protestation. There, realization ,of danger
may be material. Appellant was 18 years of
ag·e, had considerable knowledge of the operation of automobiles, and was able to estimate the speed at which cars travel. Her
opinion that the presence of four occupants
in the front seat did not hamper the driver's
ability to operate the car does not excuse her
from measuring up to the required standard
of reasonable care notwithstanding· her own
personal he lief.''
A conclusion to the same effect as that reached by
the Supreme C·ourt of Pennsylvania in the tw.o cases
'Cited .above was rea~ched by the Supreme C·ourt of
Louisiana in Lorance v. Smith, et al., 138 So. 871. There
four persons including the driver occupied the single
seat of a Ford coupe. One of the f.our was the fifteen
year old plaintiff and in discussing her and her age
the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled that she had
reached the age of discretion. Because the case parallels
the one nnvv under review so closely we quote the.refrom
the following:

~!I
J~

~

·~

Jt~.

:4~
"That Alphonsine Lorance and Adelia Menant, ~,'~ :1
the guests in this case, were guilty of in- ~ ~

1

~epetn dentt ntehgligen?de wthichdcotntrtibhu~ed_ p~--ox, .~
Ima e y o ·e acci en an
o eir InJury '[
~
,and death i's manif.es tly clear. This is made
~:s~
·cle~r ?Y the testimony.. But aside from that, ~~
plaintiffs' own allegations show that they '~ -~
were guilty of contributory negligence. They ~ ~
allege that 'Walter .Smith was guilty of 5 ~·
g!·Os·s negligenc~ in_inviting three persons ~s ~. ~
·
his guests to ride In ~ F,o,rd runabou~ built ~~"'- ~
for two and in alloWirrg and consenting to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34
Clark Morgan's driving said car in its crowded condition .at .an excessive and. unlawful
rate of speed of fifty or m.ore miles per hour,
on a foggy night'; and •That said Ford car
was bu.ilt for the accommodation of only
two persons, whereas there were. four persons
riding in said runabout, thereby making it
imp·ossible, due to the crowded cond.ition of
said ca.r, for OZark Morgan to operate said
car with safety, particularly at an unlawful
rate of speed on a foggy night.'
"We heartily concur with plaintiff's couns-el,
who drew the,se petitions, that it was negligent for Walter Smith to invite and permit
£our persons to ride in a ·small car built for
the accommodation of only two, e-specially
on a foggy night, and that it was negligent
for Clark Morgan to atten1pt to driv.e it
under such conditions, and also that its
, ·crowded conditi,on made it impo8sible for him
to operate it with safety on a foggy night.
These all·egations need no proof to support
them. It is ~self-evident that the crowding of
four grown people int:o the seat of a small
car built to accommodate only two deprives
the driver of the free us·e of both hands and
arms, without which he cannot operate it
efficiently and with safety.
''Now let us eonsider the case fro1n the standpoint of these guests. They had both reached
the age of discretion, one being fifteen years
old and the other a. woman who had been
twice married :and was the mother ·of a child
:seven years old. They knew, .as well as did
the young men, that the night was foggy,
that the Ford runabout was built for the
accommodation of only two, and that for
four people to -crowd themselves into a seat
built for two would make it impossible for
the driver to operate the car with saf.ety.
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They kne"~ this before they entered the ear
to go to Covington, and they knew it before
they got into the ear to go home. Yet they
·consented to ride in the car under those conditions; they \Yere two of the £our who crowded into the seat ; they themselves helped to
ereate the condition which made it impossible
for Clark Morgan to operate the car with
safety, helped create the condition which
brought about their injury. Now, if it wa'S
negligence on the part of the young men to
invite the women to ride under those .conditions, were not the guests also negligent in
accepting the invitation and riding under
those· ·Conditions~
M.ost assuredly they
were.''
The foregoing cases are uncommonly close upon
the facts to- the cases now under review by this court.
But the facts of our cases call even more emphatically
for the application .of the rule announced by the Pennsylvania and Louisiana cases. Here there were five fully
grown pers-ons in the Ford ·coupe and here there was a
statute condemning .such overcrowding.

Alsu, here the

evidence is positive that the driver ,of the Ford lost
and was unable to regain ·Control of the Ford under
such circumstances that the explanation mu:st be found
in the overloading of his .coupe.
Appellants assign error in that the trial court refused to strike defendant's memorandum of costs and
:a,ssert that the cost bill was not ''filed" within time.
The section .of the code which controls -the ma.tter of
·s·erving and delivering of ·Cost bill is 104-44-14 R. S. U.
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)

1933. The .pertinent part of that section reads as
follows:

~
~

l

'1~
1-~

''The party in who,se favor judgment is rendered
and who claims his ·costs must deliver to the
clerk and ·serve .a -copy upon the adverse
party within five day,s after the verdict***''.

· -~ ·""'-

It will be observed that the eode uses the language
''deliver to the clerk''. · This i1s a departure fr.om the
language used in many other sections :of the code where
it is p:r.ovided that· the documents· must he filed with
the -clerk or filed in the office of th_e ·clerk. In this case
respondent served a .copy of the -cost bill upon .appellants'
counsel in S.alt Lake City where he maintained his

· \

:office .on the fifth day after the verdict and on the s.ame

t

.\f ~
·fr:g
~

·•

.·

day delivered the same to the -clerk by depositing it in

Utah.
. · · , · to the clerk of the eourt at his office in Provo,
.
~

· ~

That the delivery of the cost bill to the ·Clerk by

:? ~depositing the same in the mail was a delivery within the

~ '::::\1 statut~ w:as held in the case of Glousc~ster Mutual Fisk-~

1'~

ing Insurance Co. v. Hall, 96 N. E. 679 (Mass.).

~ ~

See also : .~·.

";::-....
~

~

1

,'i

,. dt·~- ;.

.~\£i~
1

... t

'

HackleY_ Union National B_ank V'. Far·mer,.l ,
(M1ch.) 234 N. W.135,
~··.
Kansas f!ity Life Ins. Co. v. White, ~~-1 ~~J
(Ar1zona.) 2·64 P. 47 4;
· ,l/_ -.

1

U:nterharnscheidt v. Missouri State Life
Ins. Co., (Iowa) 138 N. W. 459.
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Appellants eo1nplain because the court awarded full
costs against the plaintiffs Smith and also against the
plaintiffs Nelson. Appellants misconceive the effect of
assessing the full amount of costs against both plaintiffs. They assert that ·One-half of the costs should
have been assessed against the plaintiffs in each case
and eontend as if the ·court were awarding double witness fees and double mileage. There was no taxing of
witne,ss fees or double mileage or double per diem. There
was taxed ·only the costs taxable in a single action and
they were taxed .against .all plaintiffs whose action made
defense necessary.
1

Hespondent does not assert the right to reooiVer
double fees for its witnesses. It paid its witnesses .only
one day for ·each day's attendance and similarly it paid
other costs only once, but it is entitled to look to all or
any of the plaintiffs f.or full reimbursement. It is
P-ntitled to a joint and ~several judgment .against all
plaintiffs ·f.or the full amount of its taxable costs and
. when its judgment or costs has once been satisfied it
c·annot, .of course, make any further recovery. It has
been put to certain expenses in connection with the
defense of the consolidated action. Either one of the
eases tried by itself would have resulted in the same
expens·es and one case, .as well as another, created the
necessity in eonnection with the consolidated trial. Respondent does not seek to recover more th.an the amount
expPnded. It seeks only one recov.e,ry, but it may look
to all plaintiffs, or any of them, for reimbursement and
if 'one of the plaintiffs !shall hereafter pay more than
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his share of the judgment for costs he may look to the
other: parties for reimbursement to the extent that his
payment has exceeded his proportionate share. Point
may be given to the co-ntention by assuming a corollary
situation. Assume that the driver of the Ford had
survived and plaintiffs had sued both this respondent
and the driver of the Ford and had recovered a verdict
against both for damages and costs. The ·costs would
not have been .app.ortioned to the two defendants but
would have been taxed in full against both. In such
case a payment by either defendant would have discharged a judgment for costs .
. Support for our contention upon this point is to be
found in the following cases :

Kerrick v. E des, 19 F. ( 2d) 693 ;
Proprietors of Kennebeck Purchase v.
Boulton, 4 Mass. 419;
William Ii. Frank Brewing Co. v. Mayor
of New York, 46 N.Y. S. 24;
·
Gray's Harbor Boom Co. v. McAmmant,
et al., (Wash.) 58 P. 573;
Lamotte v. Martin, (La.) 27 So. 291;
Moore v. Woodson, ('Tex,as) 99 S. W. 116.
SUMMARY.

An examination of the entire record fails to disclose any ·evidence of sufficient substance .or probative
value to give legal support to any finding of negligence
on the part of defendant. Defendant's truck was on
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the extre1ne righthand side of the highway .at the ·time
of the collision. The driver had moved over just a.s far
as he could to clear the way for the onco:riring Ford.
There was open to the Ford and free of ·obstruction :the
entire · east shoulder-four and one-half feet wide-·,
the entire east half of the cement strip;.-nine feet-, and
about five feet of the west half of the cement. There
was open hig·hway more t·h·an eighteen feet W!de over
which .the Ford ~ould have traveled in perfect. safety.
B.ut the Ford was out of control .and ·0ould not be: brought
into that portion of the highway intended for ·~ts ~se.
Inasmuch as the evidence compels the 0onclusion· that
the truck was on the west side of the highway '~t t~~
tin1e of the collisi·on the defendant was guilty · of no
negligence as a matter of' law. The collision resulted
'
'' ,f' '
either from the negligence of the driver of the Ford.alon·e
or from his negligence combined with that of his nmrier.ous companions who so crowded him as to make control·of the Ford difficult or impossible.
:. ... ·,,:.
.

-

...

But even if it should appear to this court that
there is some evidence of negligence on the part of th;e
defendant in the record ~still appellants' case cannot be
:rescued. It is plain that the .accident ·could ha.ve been
and would have been avoided if Sheffield had regained
control of the F·ord during the four hundred feet .b~.~
tween th~e curve and the point of impact. The ~~oiVe
men'ts of the Ford after reaching the .eurve and t;urningnorth bespeak without ·c:ontradiction .and with great elo~
qnenec the fact that the driver was so crowded ~hat
cont.rol of the driving mechanism was impossible .. ·
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It was to av,oid just such situations that the legislature, following the accident reviewed by this court in
Balle v. Smith, 'supra, enacted 57-7-50 R. S. U. 1933.
If a tragedy is necessary to demonstrate the wisdom .of
that enactment certainly thiis cas-e is demonstration
enough.
Upon the trial we ·Contended, .and we now m-ost earnestly urge upon the court, that eontributory negligence
on the part of the occupants .of the Ford was shown as
a 1ua tter of law. The trial court concluded differently
and sent the matter to the juiry with instructions clearly
leaving it to thHm to find (1) whether P·aul N.elson and
Ramona Smith were guilty ·Of any negligence, and (2)
if so, whether such negligence contributed in any degree
to the collision. The charge fully .and fairly submitted
plaintiffs' theory.
Plaintiff.s cannot be heard to complain that their
requested instruction No. 3 was not given. Paul Nelson
ca.me clearly within the ruling of t·he Newton case and
there was no showing justifying any such contention
as to Ramona Smith.
The assignments of error dealing with the cost bill
would seem to be of less than ordinary significance. In
view of the fact that this appeal is taken by all appellants
in forma pauperis the ·error.s assigned should not be
sustained. The cost bill was 'served upon appellants'
counsel and delivered to the ·clerk within the time required by the statute and certainly plaintiffs were not
entitled to have the costs .apportioned among themselves.
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To have defended either case separately the defendant
would haYe been required to produce exactly the srune
witnesses and obligate itself for the :same mileag·e as it
produced and £or which it was obligated in the consolidated hearing·. Respondent is entitled to recover its
taxable costs and if it ever 1nakes recovery from any
defendant its claim will, of courg.e, be dis-charged. It
does not seek and would not be permitted any recovery
beyond that and it should be asked to accept nothing
less.
It is respectfully submitted that plaintiffs wer·e accorded a fair hearing and that the verdict of the jury
should not be disturbed.
tTunn, RAY, QuiNNEY

_A_ttorneys f:or

&

NEBEKER,

Respo~ndent.
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